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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2629 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYREEK STYLES,  
a/k/a "Reek" 
 
    Tyreek Styles, 
          Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cr-00030-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 12, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Tyreek Styles was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs 
Act robbery, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 240 
months’ imprisonment. He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motions under 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33, along with the district court’s application 
of two sentencing enhancements: a four-level enhancement for abduction and a two-level 
enhancement for obstruction of justice. We will affirm Styles’s conviction but vacate the 
sentence and remand for resentencing based on the district court’s two-level enhancement 
for obstruction of justice. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
Tyreek Styles was one of five men who committed armed robbery of an Upper 
Darby residence. It was after midnight on December 3, 2011, when Styles and his three 
confederates, all wearing gloves and masks, approached the house of Tam Dang and 
Dung Tran and their children. The robbers were armed with a pistol and a stun gun. They 
parked out front in a gold-colored Chevy Malibu that belonged to Styles. Shortly after 
that, Tam Dang and his son returned from the family’s deli. After Dang’s son went inside 
the house, the robbers attacked Dang and beat him unconscious. Styles and his fellow 
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assailants then entered the house. They pushed Dang’s son to the ground and told Tran, at 
gunpoint, to get to the floor. The men moved the victims to the living room and held 
them down. Two of the men went upstairs and into Dang’s daughter’s room, where she 
awoke and began to scream. They hit her head against the wall, threatened her with the 
gun, demanded her silence, and then took her to the living room to join her brother and 
mother.  
The men asked where the money was. One of the men took Dang’s son upstairs at 
gunpoint and made the boy get his coin collection from his bedroom. The robber 
ransacked the boy’s room. Meanwhile, the other robbers took Tran and her daughter to 
another bedroom and took money from Tran’s purse. The robbers searched the rest of the 
house, where they collected money, a cell phone, and credit cards. Then the men fled the 
house, leaving behind their stun gun. While the men ran away, Dang’s son yelled for 
help, and one of the robbers turned around and fired a gun in his direction. The bullet 
became lodged in the second-floor-bedroom ceiling of a neighbor’s house. The men left 
the Chevy Malibu where it was parked and fled on foot.      
Sean Kenny, a local police officer, responded to the report of the shooting. On his 
way to the site, he saw two men—Tyreek Styles and his brother Tyrone Styles—running 
in the other direction and talking to each other. Tyreek continued to run, but Tyrone 
jumped over a bridge and held on with one hand. When Officer Kenny grabbed Tyrone’s 
hand, Tyrone let go of the railing and fell to the creek below. Tyrone ran away but left 
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behind a Ruger revolver (with one spent round) and about $130 in cash. The bullet that 
was recovered from Dang’s neighbor’s ceiling matched the Ruger. Near the scene, the 
officers searched a trash can and found within it a black zip-up sweatshirt, a black knit 
cap, a piece of black fabric, and white knit gloves.  
Officers at the scene that night saw the gold-colored Chevy Malibu and touched 
the hood, which was still warm. They discovered that the car was registered to Tyreek 
Styles, so they searched driver’s license databases for “Styles,” “Tyr,” and 
“Philadelphia.” This produced three matches: Tyrone Styles, Tyreek Styles, and Tyrell 
Styles. Officer Kenny looked at photographs of the three men and identified Tyrone 
Styles as the man who jumped off the bridge. The day after the robbery, the officers 
obtained a search warrant for Styles’s Malibu and when they searched it they found the 
following: a résumé for Jeremiah Stokes with a phone number; a letter written to Stokes, 
which explained how to rob a business owner; latex gloves; black fabric that matched the 
fabric recovered from the trash can; a vehicle registration with Tyreek Styles’s name; and 
a cellphone receipt with Styles’s number.  
The next day, Styles came to the Upper Darby Police Department to ask about his 
Chevy Malibu. He told a detective that the car had overheated and so he had parked it 
where the police later found it. He said he had run away when he heard shooting and, 
when he had encountered Officer Kenny, had told him where the shots were coming 
from. The officers asked Styles why he had been talking with the man who jumped off 
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the bridge. Styles became nervous. The police then asked him for his phone and the code 
to unlock it, and Styles gave them both. He also voluntarily provided a DNA sample. The 
phone contained an entry for Jeremiah Stokes. The officers obtained Stokes’s cell phone 
records, which revealed that Stokes was in the vicinity of the crime scene when the 
robbery occurred and that he had called Styles about four minutes after police responded 
to the emergency. Both the stun gun that the assailants left in the victims’ house and cloth 
recovered from the trash can were tested for DNA and matched Tyreek Styles.  
Styles was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery;1 two counts of 
Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting Hobbs Act Robbery; and two counts of using 
and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 
aiding and abetting that offense.2 Styles proceeded to trial. Jeremiah Stokes and Tyrone 
Styles testified that Tyreek Styles was a member of the conspiracy and described his 
involvement in the robbery. Styles was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 
robbery, one count of Hobbs Act robbery, and the related § 924(c) offense.3  
The district court sentenced Styles to 240 months’ imprisonment. Styles’s base 
offense level was 20, and the district court applied two four-level enhancements: the first 
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
2  One count of robbery and one count of using and carrying a firearm pertained to an 
earlier robbery. Because Styles was found not guilty with respect to that earlier robbery, 
we do not discuss it here. 
3 Styles’s convictions all pertain to the December 2011 robbery described above.  
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because one of the victims sustained serious bodily injury,4 and the second for 
abduction.5 The district court also applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 
justice based on Styles’s statements to police when he came to the station to ask about his 
impounded car.6 Styles’s total offense level was 30, and his criminal history category was 
II. The Guidelines range for the robbery counts was 108 to 135 months, and a mandatory 
consecutive term of 120 months was imposed for the § 924(c) count.   
II.7 
Styles appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions; the 
application of the four-level enhancement for abduction; and the two-level enhancement 
for obstruction of justice. 
A.  
We exercise de novo review of a district court’s decision on a Rule 29 motion for 
acquittal “and independently apply the same standard the district court uses in deciding 
the motion.”8 We review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
government to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find each essential 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.9  
                                              
4  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). 
5  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).  
6  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 
7  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
8  United States v. Caraballo–Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
9  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 7 
 
Styles contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings 
that he violated § 924(c), that he was guilty of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 
or that he committed Hobbs Act robbery.  
According to Styles, the jury should not have convicted him of the § 924(c) 
offense because there was no evidence that he knew a firearm would be used during the 
commission of the robbery. In order to convict a defendant of a § 924(c) offense, the 
government must prove “that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug 
trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or 
carry a gun during the crime’s commission.”10 Styles argues that the government failed to 
present such evidence. But this argument is belied by the record. There was testimony 
that the coconspirators had discussed the use of the gun in advance; that in preparation 
for the robbery they packed a gun along with their other supplies; and that, as they were 
driving to the scene of the crime and discussing the details of the robbery, one of the 
confederates took the gun and handed it to another. Considering this evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find that Styles knew a gun would 
be used during the robbery. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
convict Styles of the § 924(c) offense. 
Styles’s convictions for conspiracy and Hobbs Act robbery were also supported by 
the evidence. Two of Styles’s confederates—Jeremiah Stokes and Tyrone Styles—
                                              
10  Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014). 
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testified against him, describing in detail his involvement in the planning and commission 
of the robbery. Other evidence corroborated this testimony. For instance, the police found 
Styles’s car parked across the street from the victims’ house minutes after the robbery. 
The items in the car linked Styles to Stokes and to the robbery. The stun gun found at the 
victims’ house contained Styles’s DNA. Cell phone records established that Stokes had 
called Styles just minutes after the police responded to the scene. Finally, Officer Kenny 
saw Styles running away from the scene with Tyrone Styles. Styles’s argument that he 
was merely a knowing spectator fails—a rational jury could, based on the evidence 
presented at trial, conclude that Styles was a member of the conspiracy and helped 
commit the robbery. As such, Styles’s convictions for conspiracy and robbery were 
supported by sufficient evidence.  
Styles argues in the alternative that the district court erred in denying his Rule 33 
motion. We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.11 A new trial is warranted if the jury’s verdict is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence and if “there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.”12 For the foregoing 
reasons, the district court correctly denied relief under Rule 33. We will accordingly 
affirm Styles’s convictions. 
                                              
11  See United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2002). 
12  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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B. 
We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de 
novo and its factual findings for clear error.13 Styles claims that the district court erred in 
applying a four-level enhancement for abduction. The Guidelines provide for a four-level 
enhancement “[i]f any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to 
facilitate escape.”14 For the abduction enhancement to apply, three predicates must be 
met: (1) the victims must be forced to move from their original location with sufficient 
force “to permit a reasonable person an inference that he or she is not at liberty to 
refuse”; (2) “the victims must accompany the offender to that new location”; and (3) the 
relocation of the victims must further the commission of the crime or the escape.15 We 
held that these three predicates were met in Reynos, where the victims were forced to 
move approximately thirty feet from the bathroom of a pizza shop to the cash register 
area of the store.16 Thus, the abduction enhancement may be proper even where victims 
were moved only within a single structure. 
Styles acknowledges that the victims in this case were moved from the first to the 
second floor of the residence. He nevertheless suggests that the enhancement should not 
have been applied for a number of reasons: he did not personally restrain the victims who 
were moved; the movement of victims was not in furtherance of the robbery because the 
                                              
13  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). 
14  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). 
15  United States v. Reynos, 680 F.3d 283, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2012). 
16  Id. at 291. 
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robbers had access to the entire house even without moving the victims; and this case 
involved nothing more than would typically happen in a robbery. These arguments are 
unavailing. The robbers used weapons and force to move the victims from one part of the 
house to another; they accompanied the victims to the new location; and they did so 
while demanding that the victims show them where the money was. Under our precedent, 
this is sufficient for the application of the abduction enhancement, and the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in applying it. 
C. 
The Guidelines provide for a two-level sentencing enhancement if “the defendant 
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 
justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of the offense.17  
Styles claims that the district court wrongly applied this enhancement. Although the 
government proposed this sentencing enhancement, it now concedes that it should not 
have done so and that the district court erred in applying it.   
The application notes provide guidance for determining whether the enhancement 
should apply.18 The notes provide non-exhaustive lists of the types of conduct that would 
                                              
17 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 
18  See United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 548 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We have stated that 
an application note to the Sentencing Guidelines is binding ‘unless it runs afoul of the 
Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the section 
of the guidelines it purports to interpret.’” (quoting United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 
723, 731 (3d Cir. 1996))).   
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and would not be covered by § 3C1.1.19 Relevant to this case, Note 4(G) explains that the 
following would be covered by the enhancement: “providing a materially false statement 
to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official 
investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.”20 On the other hand, Note 5(B) 
explains that “making false statements, not under oath, to law enforcement officers” 
would not be covered by the enhancement, unless Note 4(G) applies.21 In other words, a 
false statement to law enforcement officers is not on its own enough to qualify as 
obstruction—false statements must be material22 and must actually obstruct the 
investigation or prosecution of the offense in a significant way.    
 Here, the government concedes that Styles’s conduct does not rise to the level of 
obstruction because none of Styles’s statements impeded the investigation in this case.23 
By the time Styles spoke to police officers, they had already searched his car and found 
evidence linking him to the robbery and to one of his confederates. Furthermore, Styles 
turned over his cell phone to police, along with the code to unlock it, which allowed the 
officers to access information that was important to the investigation. Finally, Styles 
voluntarily provided a DNA sample to police.  
                                              
19  As a general matter, “[a] defendant’s denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under 
oath that constitutes perjury) . . . is not a basis for application of this provision.” 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.2.  
20  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G). 
21  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5(B). 
22  A “material” statement is one that, “if believed, would tend to influence or affect the 
issue under determination.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6. 
23  We do question why the government requested the application of an enhancement that it 
now so unequivocally acknowledges was inappropriate.  
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 We agree that the obstruction enhancement was not applicable in this case. Its 
application by the district court was thus procedural error.24 Accordingly, we will remand 
for resentencing.  
III. 
We will affirm Styles’s conviction, but, because the district court should not have 
applied the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, we will vacate his sentence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
24  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that failing to 
make a correct computation of the Guidelines range is procedural error that generally 
requires resentencing).  
